That container ship was loaded like the town drunk at a party. Im thinking piloting them things is like trying to ride a bike on ice. Im thinking too that computerised GPS guidance could be part of modern ship navigation. Maybe temperamental technology, I don't know?:uhm:
My thoughts are generally clear. My typing, not so much.
I heard harbor on the news, now a Ship Route/Channel/Lane heading to and away from that port. At first I thought they were really close to port, but they say there are a lot of ships about going and coming.
Seems like a comedy of errors and Murphy's Law led to this disaster. Again they are saying the cargo ship turned around for some unexplained reason and headed in the opposite direction and that is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the Pacific.
Why an avoidance warning system didn't steer they away from each other, I dunno. Also that Ret Navy Capt. was talking about yielding to the ship on the right or something maybe they both tried to yield at the same time in close proximity and Wham, I dunno.
It's only true if it's on this forum where opinions are facts and facts are opinions
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
This is the USS Fitzgerald DDG military ship. I am at a loss as to how this happened.
So am I. I'd expect the Navy to be held to a higher standard, and I'd certainly expect a RADAR watch onboard the container ship. But like I said, the container ships off the west coast of the US are notorious for not even having someone on the bridge, much less a RADAR watch - and it wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if that were the case worldwide, I just don't know. Sounds like the merchantman was drunk or something... :uhm:
-Zorba, "The Veiled Male"
"If you get it and didn't work for it, someone else worked for it and didn't get it..."
The Capt. of the Fitzgerald was hurt with a head injury.
It's only true if it's on this forum where opinions are facts and facts are opinions
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
Update from Fox news- - - -all seven missing sailors were found dead in the berthing compartment. RIP!
:angel2::usa:
Jerry
That is exactly what I feared was the case. That area that was hit is loaded with berthing compartments two to three decks down from the main deck. A hull breach below the water line in that area is really bad, and even worse at the time the ships collided due to the crew not on watch being asleep in their bunks.
Fair winds and following seas to the sailors lost, and prayers for their families. :angel2:
“I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that I don't know the answer” ― Douglas Adams
Evidently folks are setting up GoFundMe sites for the families impacted. Navy is advising NOT putting money to those unless you know for sure that it's an actual group - it could be a scam. Sad but true. The "official" relief groups are the USO, American Red Cross, and Navy & Marine Corps League.
Of other consideration is that many of the sailors were berthed in those areas. They lost their stuff: tablets, phones, civilian clothes, toiletries, etc. Yeah, it's just "stuff," but for the sailors who lost stuff, it can be a sizeable loss of income, I suppose.
Those families, ie, spouse or spouse with children will have direct Navy emergency assistance, for financial issues beyond the help above they should see the Navy Marine Corps Relief Society.
They know about it and in most cases there is an Auxiliary at their Base. For those families away from a base they can call NCRS HQ directly for help.
Any casualty assistance office including the Red Cross will have that phone number.
Evidently folks are setting up GoFundMe sites for the families impacted. Navy is advising NOT putting money to those unless you know for sure that it's an actual group - it could be a scam. Sad but true. The "official" relief groups are the USO, American Red Cross, and Navy & Marine Corps League.
Of other consideration is that many of the sailors were berthed in those areas. They lost their stuff: tablets, phones, civilian clothes, toiletries, etc. Yeah, it's just "stuff," but for the sailors who lost stuff, it can be a sizeable loss of income, I suppose.
Prayers for the families affected.
Most all that stuff you listed will be in lockers and will be just fine if the lockers remained intact. The electronics will be toast, though. In the interim, you can bet your butt that their shipmates, and their brothers/sisters from the other ships in the area will be seeing to their needs in the immediate future, along with the resources NN listed. Once dewatered, the stuff in the lockers regarding clothing can be washed/dry cleaned, and be no worse for wear. Toiletries and other stuff WILL be provided, either by the ship itself, or through the relief agencies. The afloat Navy is a pretty tight group, and we take care of our own.
“I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that I don't know the answer” ― Douglas Adams
Most all that stuff you listed will be in lockers and will be just fine if the lockers remained intact. The electronics will be toast, though. In the interim, you can bet your butt that their shipmates, and their brothers/sisters from the other ships in the area will be seeing to their needs in the immediate future, along with the resources NN listed. Once dewatered, the stuff in the lockers regarding clothing can be washed/dry cleaned, and be no worse for wear. Toiletries and other stuff WILL be provided, either by the ship itself, or through the relief agencies. The afloat Navy is a pretty tight group, and we take care of our own.
I'm just going by what I've seen posted by folks who are ex-Navy.
I'm just going by what I've seen posted by folks who are ex-Navy.
I suppose things could have changed since I was runnin' the laundry, but we used salt water to wash the clothes, and used fresh water for the rinse cycle. We had special detergent for using with salt water, and regular detergent for when we were in port and hooked up to potable water supply. Washing clothes with salt water and rinsing with fresh water conserved a LOT of fresh water for showering and cooking. We made our own fresh water from sea water when cruisin' and it was easy to outrun the supply. Water hours when that happened sucked. Any wool uniforms would be the stuff that 'might' have a problem, but dry cleaning should take care of that. Absolute worst thing you could to wool dress blues is force dry them in a dryer; they shrink like crazy if you do that.
“I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that I don't know the answer” ― Douglas Adams
USS Fitzgerald is taking on water and being pumped out. Seven sailors missing. Collision was at 0230 hours local time. I'm afraid that the 7 sailors missing will be found when they get the ship in drydock and the flooded compartments dewatered. The damage is smack in the middle of the berthing area in the forward section of the ship. Looks like the anchor of the container ship did most of the damage above the main deck.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 27, 2012) The guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) transits the Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Karen Blankenship/Released)
The US Navy statement also added:
“USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) was involved in a collision with a merchant vessel at approximately 2:30 a.m. local time, June 17, while operating about 56 nautical miles southwest of Yokosuka, Japan.
Although Fitzgerald is under her own power, USS Dewey (DDG 105) got underway this morning as well as several U.S. Navy aircraft, and will join Japanese Coast Guard and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopters, ships and aircraft to render whatever assistance may be required.
This is one of those times where if I'd have been 1,000% wrong, I'd have been really happy to be wrong.
Really can't say enough for the crew of the Fitzgerald and their actions after the collision. They turned to and got the portable pumps and eductors running to keep the ship from foundering until they could be safely pulled to port. That's backbreaking work and long hours while also performing damage control and assessment of the affected areas of the ship.
Latest word I heard is that the container ship not only made a U-turn, but turned off its transponder and turned off navigation lights. It's beginning to sound like the container ship did it on purpose.
“I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that I don't know the answer” ― Douglas Adams
56 miles from Yokosuka is not really that far, probably still within the shipping lanes/channels approaching the bay/harbor, perhaps no deep water to maneuver.
Also, radar takes time to indicate course and speed changes, especially given these reports about erratic maneuvering by the merchant, the closer the distance the less time there is to indicate course and speed changes and even less time to avoid the collision.
The media outlets have shown the track of both vessels and the container ship did quite a bit of maneuvering to run at the Navy ship and it kinda looked deliberate. I have an antiquated Sitex radar on my boat and it updates every three seconds or so. A friend has a modern Garmin unit on his boat that updates a couple of times a second and I'm pretty sure that the US Navy has way better stuff than we do. Even if it updated once every minute, they would have had enough time to do some water ballet maneuvers before they avoided a collision.
My uncle is a retired Navy O-5/skipper and he simply doesn't know how this was possible. He said that nights ops simply don't happen with a functioning nav radsr (the fire control radar from the weapon system can be used as a backup), and that looks are on deck 24/7 to avoid this exact scenario. Alarms are set to trigger for a pre-set CPA (closest point of approach). He said that his ship had a 1,000 yard CPA, and that he gave orders to be notified or awakened to be notified if anything violated that CPA. He made further orders to*break his door down* if he could not be rosen from his sleep under the assumption that he was incapacitated. Orders would come from the XO at that point, but nobody would ever be expected to stand around atupidly while the ship hit something or came under attack.
Accuracy: because white space between bullet holes drives me insane.
I've been to sea a few times aboard USN ships. I don't see how this could happen, even in a crowded shipping lane, unless it was intentional on someone's part.
Ship ramming is uncommon, but not unheard of. USS Cole comes to mind. And who would have thought to use multiple airliners as weapons, until it happened.
Mike
"Walking away seems to be a lost art form." N454casull
I can't link it with my tablet but if you look at the track of the container ship, it looks like it took them two attempts to connect with the destroyer as their track showed a sharp turn into the path of the destroyer about an hour before they connected. It looks like they miscalculated and ran up ahead of the destroyer to turn around and try again. I think that there's a lot more to the story.
Ok, my bad, the initial article that I read showed the direction of the container ship's travel backwards. The second dip toward the destroyer was when they returned to the site of the collision.
Something "Fishy" about this collision and the events that led up to it.
It's only true if it's on this forum where opinions are facts and facts are opinions
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
Coppock testified that she had been instructed by the commanding
officer to maintain 20 knots, even as the ship traversed heavily
trafficked waters and its main navigation radar stopped working fully
about an hour before the collision.
Meanwhile, she said the “low confidence” she had in some of her fellow
watch standers played into her decision not to be in closer
communication with sailors in the Combat Information Center. Below deck,
they are supposed to gather and communicate radar and other information
to the bridge.
Coppock described an unspoken culture on the ship not to follow the
standing orders to contact the commanding officer when the ship is
within 6,000 yards of another ship “especially in that specific area.”
“We would have called him every five minutes,” she said.
She acknowledged losing situational awareness and not sounding the
alarm to alert the crew ahead of the collision. Coppock said she was
focused on something else and the rest of her crew froze.
In his closing statement, one of Coppock’s defense counsel, Lt. Ryan
Mooney, said the Navy needs to make systemic changes to ensure this kind
of tragedy does not get repeated.
Citing lengthy reports completed since the collisions, Mooney painted a
picture of crew that was overtasked and exhausted. The Fitzgerald was
one of several ships in the Japan-based 7th Fleet that was undermanned
and missing important experienced crewmembers. Critical training and
qualifications were pushed off because of operational tasking.
(Over tasked, and exhausted, missing experienced crew members and undermanned. That was how it was in the mid 1970s at the end of the draft at the end of the VN war. Ships were chronically undermanned. Training was still done, though, and you just got less sleep on a regular basis. With a tight crew, you complained a lot, but you did your damned job! )
Radars were not the only equipment in disrepair, affecting reliability and confidence, he said.
(NO EXCUSES for equipment being in disrepair unless battle damaged! IF you have the repair parts, you TURN TO and work around the clock until the equipment is back up and in operation. Other backup systems are available and should have been used until that happened.)
After the collision, a test taken by a control group of officers on
board showed that the average score on “rules of the road” at sea was 59
percent, with just three officers scoring over 80 percent, Mooney said.
One of the two officers that Coppock was working closely with that
night told investigators she had never heard of the voluntary traffic
separation scheme governing heavily trafficked shipping lanes, he said.
“What does that say about the state of training on the Fitzgerald?” he said.
The other officer was new, with little experience.
(This is a direct reflection of the Captain of the ship not maintaining a training schedule to get new members of the officers and crew up to speed on training. THAT is a critical part of the training and the Captain is responsible for seeing it happens on a timely basis. The failure of the Captain to maintain and ensure training is carried out falls on his/her shoulders entirely. And in the situation the ship was in in a heavy ship traffic area Coppock SHOULD NOT have been on the bridge alone. Another experienced officer should have also been there to do training on 'rules of the road' and be ready to take over if the situation warranted it.)
Mooney said given the state of the Fitzgerald, Coppock “was set up to fail.”
He presented two dozen pages with letters and photos showing Coppock to
be a dedicated sailor who’d found her calling in the military and
genuinely cared for her shipmates.
He described a tattoo Coppock got on her wrist after the collision. It
contained the coordinates of the ship at that moment, framed by the
phrase “Protect Your People” above it and seven clovers beneath it.
“Forever a reminder of her failures that night,” Mooney said.
Article 32 proceedings begin Wednesday against two more junior
officers, both lieutenants whose names have not been released. They face
three charges: dereliction in the performance of duties through neglect
resulting in death, negligent hazarding of a vessel and negligent
homicide.
The tactical information officer is accused of failing in her job to
“communicate with the bridge vital contact information and safe speed
and maneuvering recommendations, enforce watch-standing principles in
the combat information center and support the officer of the deck.”
(THAT is unacceptable behavior at any level. CIC (Combat Information Center) is the eyes and ears of the ship, especially at night, and not relaying any contact information in a timely manner to the Officer of the Deck is unconscionable especially in a crowded sea lane. Not enforcing watch-standing principles is the mark of a sloppy officer. But it also reflects poorly on the enlisted manning the stations in CIC; they are obligated to relay critical info to the bridge regardless of the unacceptable actions of the officer in CIC.)
The surface warfare officer is charged with “effectively failing in his
duties to supervise those on watch in the USS Fitzgerald Combat
Information Center,” which monitors the operations of the ships and
maintains contact with the bridge and the tactical action officer. He is
faulted with failing “to maintain surface contact situational
awareness; provide operational recommendations to the tactical action
officer and the bridge, ensure proper watch-standing practices were
carried out; and properly stand his assigned station.”
(And another officer failing to do the critical job of keeping the bridge informed of the situation, and not maintaining a high level of situational awareness in a crowded sea lane. Not relaying critical information to the bridge is unacceptable.)
From what I've read of the incident since then, there seems to be an overall failure of the Navy to maintain high training standards and enforce those standards. Being on an undermanned ship is no excuse for slacking up on training; it is pretty much a way of life in the services. Not maintaining proper command and ensuring that the crew maintains the high standards required for operations falls directly on the officers in charge of the ship. THAT failure is indicative of a lousy command structure from above that allows such low standards to be the norm. A lot of people didn't do their damned job, didn't take their job seriously enough, and the collision was the result. The crew of the ship paid a heavy price for that failure.
“I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that I don't know the answer” ― Douglas Adams
Replies
Seems like a comedy of errors and Murphy's Law led to this disaster. Again they are saying the cargo ship turned around for some unexplained reason and headed in the opposite direction and that is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the Pacific.
Why an avoidance warning system didn't steer they away from each other, I dunno. Also that Ret Navy Capt. was talking about yielding to the ship on the right or something maybe they both tried to yield at the same time in close proximity and Wham, I dunno.
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
So am I. I'd expect the Navy to be held to a higher standard, and I'd certainly expect a RADAR watch onboard the container ship. But like I said, the container ships off the west coast of the US are notorious for not even having someone on the bridge, much less a RADAR watch - and it wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if that were the case worldwide, I just don't know. Sounds like the merchantman was drunk or something... :uhm:
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
:angel2::usa:
Jerry
Figured that would be the case....Rest in Peace Sailors...Fair Winds and Following Seas....
That is exactly what I feared was the case. That area that was hit is loaded with berthing compartments two to three decks down from the main deck. A hull breach below the water line in that area is really bad, and even worse at the time the ships collided due to the crew not on watch being asleep in their bunks.
Fair winds and following seas to the sailors lost, and prayers for their families. :angel2:
― Douglas Adams
Of other consideration is that many of the sailors were berthed in those areas. They lost their stuff: tablets, phones, civilian clothes, toiletries, etc. Yeah, it's just "stuff," but for the sailors who lost stuff, it can be a sizeable loss of income, I suppose.
Prayers for the families affected.
Anyone thinking of such a participation should review the info at this link first:
https://www.thebalance.com/active-duty-death-entitlements-3356940
They know about it and in most cases there is an Auxiliary at their Base. For those families away from a base they can call NCRS HQ directly for help.
Any casualty assistance office including the Red Cross will have that phone number.
Most all that stuff you listed will be in lockers and will be just fine if the lockers remained intact. The electronics will be toast, though. In the interim, you can bet your butt that their shipmates, and their brothers/sisters from the other ships in the area will be seeing to their needs in the immediate future, along with the resources NN listed. Once dewatered, the stuff in the lockers regarding clothing can be washed/dry cleaned, and be no worse for wear. Toiletries and other stuff WILL be provided, either by the ship itself, or through the relief agencies. The afloat Navy is a pretty tight group, and we take care of our own.
― Douglas Adams
Fair Winds and Following Seas:angel2:
I suppose things could have changed since I was runnin' the laundry, but we used salt water to wash the clothes, and used fresh water for the rinse cycle. We had special detergent for using with salt water, and regular detergent for when we were in port and hooked up to potable water supply. Washing clothes with salt water and rinsing with fresh water conserved a LOT of fresh water for showering and cooking. We made our own fresh water from sea water when cruisin' and it was easy to outrun the supply. Water hours when that happened sucked. Any wool uniforms would be the stuff that 'might' have a problem, but dry cleaning should take care of that. Absolute worst thing you could to wool dress blues is force dry them in a dryer; they shrink like crazy if you do that.
― Douglas Adams
You nailed that one dead on the head.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KCiMdR1ox0
Son that's somebody with nothing to do with his time but keep me in trouble with mom.
This is one of those times where if I'd have been 1,000% wrong, I'd have been really happy to be wrong.
Really can't say enough for the crew of the Fitzgerald and their actions after the collision. They turned to and got the portable pumps and eductors running to keep the ship from foundering until they could be safely pulled to port. That's backbreaking work and long hours while also performing damage control and assessment of the affected areas of the ship.
Latest word I heard is that the container ship not only made a U-turn, but turned off its transponder and turned off navigation lights. It's beginning to sound like the container ship did it on purpose.
― Douglas Adams
The media outlets have shown the track of both vessels and the container ship did quite a bit of maneuvering to run at the Navy ship and it kinda looked deliberate. I have an antiquated Sitex radar on my boat and it updates every three seconds or so. A friend has a modern Garmin unit on his boat that updates a couple of times a second and I'm pretty sure that the US Navy has way better stuff than we do. Even if it updated once every minute, they would have had enough time to do some water ballet maneuvers before they avoided a collision.
Ship ramming is uncommon, but not unheard of. USS Cole comes to mind. And who would have thought to use multiple airliners as weapons, until it happened.
Mike
N454casull
Mike
N454casull
Ok, my bad, the initial article that I read showed the direction of the container ship's travel backwards. The second dip toward the destroyer was when they returned to the site of the collision.
Words of wisdom from Big Chief: Flush twice, it's a long way to the Mess Hall
I'd rather have my sister work in a whorehouse than own another Taurus!
Interesting read with lots of well thought out points.
https://www.stripes.com/fitzgerald-officer-of-the-deck-pleads-guilty-at-court-martial-1.525888
May 8, 2018
Coppock testified that she had been instructed by the commanding officer to maintain 20 knots, even as the ship traversed heavily trafficked waters and its main navigation radar stopped working fully about an hour before the collision.
Meanwhile, she said the “low confidence” she had in some of her fellow watch standers played into her decision not to be in closer communication with sailors in the Combat Information Center. Below deck, they are supposed to gather and communicate radar and other information to the bridge.
Coppock described an unspoken culture on the ship not to follow the standing orders to contact the commanding officer when the ship is within 6,000 yards of another ship “especially in that specific area.”
“We would have called him every five minutes,” she said.
She acknowledged losing situational awareness and not sounding the alarm to alert the crew ahead of the collision. Coppock said she was focused on something else and the rest of her crew froze.
https://www.stripes.com/fitzgerald-officer-of-the-deck-pleads-guilty-at-court-martial-1.525888
In his closing statement, one of Coppock’s defense counsel, Lt. Ryan Mooney, said the Navy needs to make systemic changes to ensure this kind of tragedy does not get repeated.
Citing lengthy reports completed since the collisions, Mooney painted a picture of crew that was overtasked and exhausted. The Fitzgerald was one of several ships in the Japan-based 7th Fleet that was undermanned and missing important experienced crewmembers. Critical training and qualifications were pushed off because of operational tasking.
(Over tasked, and exhausted, missing experienced crew members and undermanned. That was how it was in the mid 1970s at the end of the draft at the end of the VN war. Ships were chronically undermanned. Training was still done, though, and you just got less sleep on a regular basis. With a tight crew, you complained a lot, but you did your damned job! )
Radars were not the only equipment in disrepair, affecting reliability and confidence, he said.
(NO EXCUSES for equipment being in disrepair unless battle damaged! IF you have the repair parts, you TURN TO and work around the clock until the equipment is back up and in operation. Other backup systems are available and should have been used until that happened.)
After the collision, a test taken by a control group of officers on board showed that the average score on “rules of the road” at sea was 59 percent, with just three officers scoring over 80 percent, Mooney said.
One of the two officers that Coppock was working closely with that night told investigators she had never heard of the voluntary traffic separation scheme governing heavily trafficked shipping lanes, he said.
“What does that say about the state of training on the Fitzgerald?” he said.
The other officer was new, with little experience.
(This is a direct reflection of the Captain of the ship not maintaining a training schedule to get new members of the officers and crew up to speed on training. THAT is a critical part of the training and the Captain is responsible for seeing it happens on a timely basis. The failure of the Captain to maintain and ensure training is carried out falls on his/her shoulders entirely. And in the situation the ship was in in a heavy ship traffic area Coppock SHOULD NOT have been on the bridge alone. Another experienced officer should have also been there to do training on 'rules of the road' and be ready to take over if the situation warranted it.)
Mooney said given the state of the Fitzgerald, Coppock “was set up to fail.”
He presented two dozen pages with letters and photos showing Coppock to be a dedicated sailor who’d found her calling in the military and genuinely cared for her shipmates.
He described a tattoo Coppock got on her wrist after the collision. It contained the coordinates of the ship at that moment, framed by the phrase “Protect Your People” above it and seven clovers beneath it.
“Forever a reminder of her failures that night,” Mooney said.
Article 32 proceedings begin Wednesday against two more junior officers, both lieutenants whose names have not been released. They face three charges: dereliction in the performance of duties through neglect resulting in death, negligent hazarding of a vessel and negligent homicide.
The tactical information officer is accused of failing in her job to “communicate with the bridge vital contact information and safe speed and maneuvering recommendations, enforce watch-standing principles in the combat information center and support the officer of the deck.”
(THAT is unacceptable behavior at any level. CIC (Combat Information Center) is the eyes and ears of the ship, especially at night, and not relaying any contact information in a timely manner to the Officer of the Deck is unconscionable especially in a crowded sea lane. Not enforcing watch-standing principles is the mark of a sloppy officer. But it also reflects poorly on the enlisted manning the stations in CIC; they are obligated to relay critical info to the bridge regardless of the unacceptable actions of the officer in CIC.)
The surface warfare officer is charged with “effectively failing in his duties to supervise those on watch in the USS Fitzgerald Combat Information Center,” which monitors the operations of the ships and maintains contact with the bridge and the tactical action officer. He is faulted with failing “to maintain surface contact situational awareness; provide operational recommendations to the tactical action officer and the bridge, ensure proper watch-standing practices were carried out; and properly stand his assigned station.”
(And another officer failing to do the critical job of keeping the bridge informed of the situation, and not maintaining a high level of situational awareness in a crowded sea lane. Not relaying critical information to the bridge is unacceptable.)From what I've read of the incident since then, there seems to be an overall failure of the Navy to maintain high training standards and enforce those standards. Being on an undermanned ship is no excuse for slacking up on training; it is pretty much a way of life in the services. Not maintaining proper command and ensuring that the crew maintains the high standards required for operations falls directly on the officers in charge of the ship. THAT failure is indicative of a lousy command structure from above that allows such low standards to be the norm. A lot of people didn't do their damned job, didn't take their job seriously enough, and the collision was the result. The crew of the ship paid a heavy price for that failure.
― Douglas Adams